788

Secretary Shultz

Current
Policy
No. 788

Enhancing Diplomatic Security

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

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Following is a statement by Secretary Shultz before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1986.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak in support of the Administration's proposals to strengthen the security of U. S. diplomatic operations. These proposals are based on the recommendations of the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security [Inman panel] and much work and thought in the Department and other interested agencies.

Over the past few years, the attention of the world has been riveted to terrorist dramas unfolding around the globe. This is a new and chilling phenomenon, one with which civilized nations and civilized peoples are inadequately equipped to deal. That can and must change. We must do everything we can to thwart those who seek to advance their ends through terror. We must protect official Americans and their dependents from these criminal activities.

We in the State Department and our colleagues from other agencies serving abroad are on the front line. Our friends and colleagues have been victims of this violence. But the challenge of terrorism has strengthened our determination. The courage and patriotism of our people and their families in the face of these dangers are inspiring.

We must spare no effort to ensure the safety of the people and facilities of all agencies abroad. In this period of budgetary stringency, this task *must* be a priority. Therefore, we have designed a program which, in our view, is prudent, thoroughly thought out, efficient in its commitment of resources—yet responsive to the inescapable necessity we now face.

The United States has always built handsome and accessible embassies and consulates abroad. Our object was to be easily accessible—to demonstrate to other peoples the openness of our society and the hand of friendship we extend to all. We wanted the local populace to see a "welcome" sign above our door and to feel comfortable in entering our buildings. This is the essence of the job we do overseas, and we have been highly successful at it.

We are now faced with a new situation: the current security and terrorist problems have left those same buildings vulnerable. Our challenge is to strengthen our security against the new dangers so that we can maintain our tradition of openness and accessibility. We will *not* let the terrorists win their victory by isolating us, forcing us to close our doors, or denying us our contacts with the peoples of the countries in which we are represented.

The Advisory Panel on Overseas Security

With this goal in mind, I formed the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, chaired by Admiral Inman. I asked the panel to take a hard look at our security and counterterrorism programs. I didn't want or need an apologia; I wanted ideas and recommendations.

I am extremely pleased with the panel's report. The hard work and dedication of the panel is clearly reflected in the quality of its report. The panel exhaustively researched all aspects of our security and counterterrorism programs. Its recommendations have vision and, perhaps more importantly, are practical. They are recommendations which, with your support, are achievable.

The panel gave us 91 recommendations. We have implemented 45, and work is underway on 20 more. An additional 20 are awaiting the resources requested in this proposed legislation.

The recommendations focused on three central points:

- That a Bureau of Diplomatic Security with a Diplomatic Security Service be established in the Department to increase the professionalism of our security personnel and programs;
- That my overall responsibility and that of the Chiefs of Mission for overseas security programs be emphasized because such supervision is fundamental to good management; and
- That significant new resources be made available for a comprehensive worldwide security program to protect all government employees abroad. A key element here is a major multiyear construction program to rebuild or replace embassies and consulates over-

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seas which fall significantly below our physical and technical security standards. Other elements are the upgrading of our communications to state-of-the-art technology so they are faster and more secure and improved intelligence-sharing with host governments and within our own government.

Actions Taken

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Diplomatic Security Service have been established, with your support, through reprogramming of funds. In addition, using existing funds and authorities, we have already:

- Started an ambitious recruitment campaign to bring on board nearly 300 new security agents during fiscal year (FY) 1986 and to more than double the number of overseas security officers before the end of this fiscal year;
- Significantly improved training for security agents;
- Streamlined threat-alert procedures;
- Increased the number of local guards worldwide;
- Added more marines and marine guard detachments to posts;
- Nearly doubled the size of our armored vehicle fleet overseas;
- Made significant physical security improvements at 152 posts in 1985; and
- Dispatched mobile training teams to high-threat posts to provide specialized security training to U.S. Government personnel, dependents, and Foreign Service nationals.

Administration's Proposals

The Administration's proposals now before you will, in addition, do three things:

First, they would authorize a 5-year construction program to replace or upgrade our most vulnerable posts and further authorize improvements in communications and intelligence-sharing, all as recommended by the Inman panel.

Second, our proposals would complete the reorganization of our security program, as recommended by the Inman panel, by providing for a new Assistant Secretary of State to head a Bureau of Diplomatic Security and for a Director of the Diplomatic Security Service. The bureau would be responsible for all operational aspects of our security program. We would authorize certain special recruitment and performance standards for members of the Diplomatic Security Service and emphasize such operational matters as residential, perimeter, and technical security.

In one respect, we have gone beyond the recommendations of the Inman panel. Where the panel favored placing the policy arm of our counterterrorism effort with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, we have, through reprogramming, created an Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, reporting directly to me. Before this reorganization last November 4, this policy function rested with an office reporting to the Under Secretary for Management. This reorganization demonstrates the high priority we place on counterterrorism; it strengthens the interagency role of this key office on the many issues on which the State Department is the lead agency.

Third, our proposals would revise and clarify the chain of command for overseas security, fixing supervisory responsibility directly on the chief of mission and the Secretary of State. They would also formalize and expand the current process by which responsible officials are held accountable for their actions—or inaction. We would now have an automatic investigation whenever there is a security breach that results in serious bodily injury, loss of life, or significant damage to our property.

Although the draft bill requests "such sums as may be necessary," the Administration's total authorization funding requirement for this program is $4.4 billion spread over 5 years. Of this total, $2.7 billion is for construction, and the balance is for related operating expenses including security officers, residential security improvements, and more secure communications equipment. In fiscal year 1986, the Administration is requesting $237 million for salaries and expenses and $455 million for construction. In FY 1987, the Administration is requesting $304 million for salaries and expenses and $1.1 billion for construction for this program.

The Construction Program

The Inman panel recommended several new security standards—a 100-foot setback, for example. I have accepted these standards, and the set-back shall be the goal for our buildings, wherever feasible. Many posts do not meet these standards; thus, a new building program is needed.

Many posts front onto busy streets. Some have extensive glass facades. Often we share office buildings with other organizations and businesses. In still other cases, our embassies and consulates share walls with non-U.S. Government tenants. All this is clearly and generally undesirable and simply unacceptable in a great many situations.

The program places its highest priority on buildings at locations where the security threat is greatest and which are substantially below the new standards.

Great effort has gone into creating a security construction program which would ensure that buildings are designed and built to meet stringent security standards, on time and within budget. It was clear from the outset that a massive expansion of the staff of our Foreign Buildings Office to implement such a major program was not the answer. We have, instead, developed an implementation plan based on the following policies:

- Use of "fast track" and "design/build" methods to accelerate the design and construction process so that projects can be completed more quickly than was possible under previous programs;
- Use of risk analysis, constructability, and value engineering reviews to ensure that design requirements are compatible with local conditions, material availability, and technical capabilities and are cost-effective;
- Upgrade of construction contractor qualification requirements to ensure that construction awards are made to contractors with the financial, organizational, and technical qualifications necessary for successful completion of a major overseas building program;
- Allocation of sufficient resources to onsite construction oversight and inspection to ensure that buildings are constructed to required standards; and
- Use of recommendations from a major research program undertaken for our Foreign Buildings Office by the National Academy of Sciences; these provide the scientific and technical bases, in the form of performance-based security design criteria, for the design and construction of future embassy buildings.

The private sector will play a key role in ensuring effective management and implementation of the building program. We have published a synopsis of our program in the *Commerce Business Daily* with a request for particulars of qualification and experience from private sector firms interested in providing us with program, design and engineering, construction, and operations management services.

We will be ready to enter into a contract with our first private sector pro-

gram manager immediately upon receipt of an authorization and appropriation from the Congress.

Bureau of Diplomatic Security

As I said earlier, this legislation would complete the reorganization of security responsibilties in the Department recommended by the Inman panel by:

- Providing for an Assistant Secretary of State to head the new Bureau of Diplomatic Security;
- Creating a Director of the Diplomatic Security Service;
- Establishing several special job-related requirements for membership in the Diplomatic Security Service; and
- Increasing our emphasis on key operational security programs.

The new bureau will concentrate on improving:

- The security of the homes of our people and their families overseas;
- Perimeter security at our facilities;
- Technical security to update and improve our ability to cope with the unprecedented threat of sophisticated penetration systems used by hostile intelligence services against our facilities abroad;
- Protection of foreign dignitaries in the United States;
- Qualifications and performances of our local guards at overseas posts;
- Professionalism and training for our security personnel; and
- Security at Moscow and other East European posts by, among other things, substituting Americans for a substantial number of local employees now working in support positions.

Diplomatic Security Service

I envision the Diplomatic Security Service as a highly professional security organization with the recognition and respect that brings. The panel called for increased professional training, physical fitness standards, and an identifiable career structure within the Foreign Service for the Department's security cadre. I strongly support these recommendations.

The Diplomatic Security Service is to be staffed by drawing upon the existing Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel systems. This proposal will not create a new personnel system. Rather it identifies a category of employees in the same manner as do the designations "political officer" or "economic officer." Qualifications required for assignment or appointment to positions in the Diplomatic Security Service will be prescribed by the Secretary of State. In the case of security officers, the position qualifications may include minimum and maximum entry-age limitations—perhaps 21 years minimum and 35 years maximum. Such limitations are commonly found in organizations having security-related responsibilities.

In addition, the position qualifications for security officers will incorporate the standards now required by law to carry out our security functions and to exercise the Department's law enforcement authorities. As security officers perform such unique functions as protecting lives and carrying firearms in certain situations, the Secretary will be authorized to issue regulations providing for special disciplinary procedures. This is a common practice among organizations with security-related responsibilities.

The Chain of Command

The Inman panel concluded that management of the security program was overly fragmented and that the chain of command ought to be revised so that the resulting sharper supervisory focus would encourage better management and protection of U.S. Government personnel overseas.

Therefore, the Administration's proposed legislation fixes overall responsibility and authority for the management and direction of the U.S. security program overseas on the Secretary of State and, through him, the Ambassador at post.

We are working closely with other agencies to develop and agree upon appropriate security standards, procedures, and resource levels that are responsive to the needs of all U.S. Government agencies having facilities overseas, except for military bases. Physical security standards and procedures for USIA [United States Information Agency] libraries and relay stations, as well as AID [Agency for International Development] and other facilities located separately from embassies and consulates, may differ from those applied to embassies, consulates, and diplomatic residences. But the Ambassador at post and, through him, the Department will have central responsibility for security at these facilities as well as our embassies.

This proposal does not affect the Washington-based security offices of other agencies. There is sound management justification for each agency having its own security advisers in Washington. These advisers play an important role within their agencies, and we need their help in planning and implementing this program.

The Administration's proposal also does not affect the authority or responsibility of any other Federal, state, or local agency with respect to law enforcement, domestic security operations, intelligence activities as defined by Executive order, or the provision of protective services by the Secret Service.

In reviewing the security chain of command, the Inman panel recommended that we have a procedure established in law to draw lessons from security disasters or to fix individual responsibility, if any, for such incidents. The Administration agrees, and this proposal expands our current procedures by creating Accountability Review Boards to investigate incidents involving serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at or related to U.S. Government missions abroad (other than military installations). Such boards would not only make findings relating to security generally, but they would also determine if a breach of duty by an individual employee contributed to the incident. The employing agency would review and act on the findings of the board.

Conclusion

The Administration is proposing a major, national program to improve the physical and technical security of all departments and agencies abroad, except for military bases, as well as the physical security of foreign missions and officials in this country. This proposed legislation is the product of long, hard work to which many agencies have contributed and is intended to meet their requirements. The most important contributions have come from AID, USIA, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], Justice, Defense, OPM [Office of Personnel Management], OMB [Office of Management and Budget], Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury.

Our proposal's overriding goal is to maintain the American tradition of overseas posts that extend the warm hand of welcome to the local population. The program I have outlined today is intended to ensure this openness in light of the dangers of today's world. We must not forget the purpose of our overseas presence is to spread our message and communicate our ideals to other nations, not to overwhelm our hosts with the aura of our power by erecting forbidding fortresses.

The Administration's proposed program will not solve all of our security problems, but we can minimize them. Our proposal is a comprehensive—and long overdue—security program which addresses our most basic security concerns. We will need to continue to supplement our limited resources with vigilance and effective intelligence to enhance the security of our posts and the effectiveness, as well as the safety, of our missions abroad.

The President and his Administration place the highest priority on this program. We recommend its early enactment. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • February 1986
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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